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I. 
2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
3 A. Nature of the Case 
4 This case sterns from a divorce proceeding held at the magistrate court level over several 
5 
months, concluding in 2006, which ultimately resulted in Amended Findings of Fact, 
6 
Conclusions of Law and an Order entered by the Magistrate Judge. The Appellant's appeal is 
7 
8 untimely, attempts to introduce new evidence on appeal that was not presented to the Magistrate 
9 Judge, either at the trial, or through a proper motion pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
10 
Procedure, and includes arguments that are not proper for an appeal. 
11 
For ease of reference, throughout this brief Dennis J. Sallaz (the Appellant) will be 
12 
13 
referred to as "Dennis," Renee L. Baird (the Respondent) will be referred to as "Renee," and 
14 Jeremy 1. Gugino (the Trustee/Intervenor) will be referred to as "Gugino." 
15 B. Course of Proceedings Below 
16 
Renee commenced a divorce action on May 27, 2004, based on a previous marriage to 
17 
18 
Dennis. A decree granting the divorce was entered August 24, 2005 (nunc pro tunc to July 28, 
19 2005). Clerk's Record (UR "), p. 23-24. That decree included a Rule 54(b) Certificate. The 
20 August 24, 2005 decree was never appealed. A subsequent trial ensued regarding the division of 
21 
property and debts, which led to the entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, 
22 
23 
entered on October 30, 2007. That Order specifically found that Dennis and Renee had been 
24 married on July 4, 1996. R, p. 25-68. Several post-trial motions ensued, including motions to 
25 amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order - none of which dealt with the 
26 
court's finding that the parties were married. 
27 
Ultimately, the court entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
28 
29 Order on or around January 4, 2012. R, p. 126-172. The Notice of Appeal was filed on or 






























around February 9,2012. R, p. 193-196. Renee filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition on April 
19, 2012. R, p. 197-201. The filing of the bankruptcy petition stayed the appeal, until Dennis 
received stay relief from the bankruptcy court to pursue the appeal. R, p. 202-204. Gugino 
successfully intervened in the appeal as the real party in interest regarding the judgments entered 
by the Magistrate Judge. 1 R, p. 205-208; 346-348. 
The District Court denied Dennis's appeal on various grounds. R, p. 349-360. Most 
importantly for this Supreme Court appeal, the District Court found that Dennis had previously 
asserted and admitted that the parties were married, had failed to properly and timely appeal that 
issue from the magistrate court, and that his subject matter jurisdiction arguments were 
unavailing. R, p. 350-353. 
c. Statement of Facts 
In addition to the facts outlined in Dennis' brief on appeal (the accuracy of which Gugino 
does not concede), Gugino states the following additional facts: The parties were married on 
July 4, 1996, in Oregon. The Complaint in this matter included a specific allegation that the 
parties were married on July 4, 1996, and had been married ever since that date. R, p. 14. In his 
Answer to the Complaint, Sallaz admits those allegations of the Complaint. R, p. 17. As part of 
his testimony at the trial of this matter, Dennis testified that he married Renee on July 4, 1996.2 
D. Standard of Review 
I Dennis now tries to avoid Gugino's involvement in this Supreme Court appeal by arguing that the sole issue on 
appeal is whether the parties (i.e., Dennis and Renee) were married - thus "mooting" any interest of the bankruptcy 
estate in the outcome of this appeal. However, this argument ignores the very arguments Dennis makes further in 
his appellate brief that if no valid marriage existed the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction or ability to divide 
property. It is this division of property that Dennis is actually trying to avoid - even if not directly appealed. 
Accordingly, the bankruptcy estate (by and through its Trustee, Gugino) remains a real party in interest in this 
appeal. 
2 While it does not appear to have been in evidence at the trial court level, Dennis also testified at his deposition in 
this matter that he was married to Renee on July 4, 1996 in Portland, Oregon. 











This Court is being asked to review the District Court's decision after the District Court 
sat in its appellate capacity over the magistrate judge's decision. Accordingly, the standard of 
review by this Court is as follows: 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's 
findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those 
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom 
and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the Supreme Court] 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Thus, [the Supreme 
Court] does not review the decision of the magistrate court. Rather, [the Supreme 
Court is] procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district 
court. 



















An issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, if it was not previously presented to 
the trial judge. See, e.g., McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003). 
"Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented 
[in the lower court]. In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be raised in the 
[lower court] '" Appellate courts follow this rule because it would be unfair to overrule the 
[lower court] on issues not presented to it on which it did not have an opportunity to rule." 
Wattanbarger v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho 308, 323-24, 246 P.3d 961, 967-77 
(2010) (internal citations omitted). 
A motion to amend findings or conclusions or to make additional findings or 
conclusions shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the 
judgment, and if granted the court may amend the judgment accordingly. 
Idaho Rule o/Civil Procedure 52(b). 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues in an action for any of the following reasons: 






























4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, 
which the party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
A motion for new trial shall be served not later than fourteen (14) days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than fourteen 
(14) days after entry ofthe judgment. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a), (b) and (e). 
On motion and upon such tenns as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final jUdgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which bv due diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move tor a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time, and tor reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the 
judgment, order. or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
Such motion does not require leave from the Supreme Court, or the district court, 
as the case may be, as though the judgment has been affinned or settled upon 
appeal to that court ... 
Idaho Rule o.fCivil Procedure 60(b) (emphasis added). 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits a party from assuming a position in one 
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding ... 
Generally when a litigant, through sworn statements, obtains a judgment, 
advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating 
such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or 
testimony, be pennitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, 
arising out of the same transaction or subject matter. 
Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748, 215 P.3d 457, 469 
(2009) (internal citations omitted). 






























ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL 
In addition to the issues on appeal listed by Dennis in his Appellant Brief (the accuracy 
and appealability of which Gugino does not concede, as outlined below), Gugino also asserts, as 
an additional issue on appeal, whether Gugino and/or Renee are entitled to an award of attorney 




The Trial Court Had Sufficient Jurisdiction to Decide the Parties' Marriage 
and Divorce. 
The district courts of Idaho have exclusive original jurisdiction over all domestic 
relations matter, including divorce actions. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 32-715. This jurisdiction has 
been delegated by the district courts to the magistrate division for trial purposes. See IRCP 
82(c)(2)(C). In any divorce case, the magistrate court must make certain preliminary findings 
before awarding any property or debts to the parties. The threshold question made by every trial 
judge in a divorce proceeding is whether the parties to the divorce proceeding were actually 
married. If the trial court decides there was no valid marriage, the court still possesses 
jurisdiction to enter appropriate findings, but would decline to determine grounds for divorce or 
divide marital property, not on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, but on the basis of moot ness. 
"A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no 
practical effect upon the outcome." Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs., 143 Idaho 501, 509 (2006) 
(internal citations omitted). However, the trial court obviously has subject matter jurisdiction to 
determine whether the parties were validly married. 






























Here, the trial court specifically found that the parties were married on July 4, 1996. R, p. 
23-24 (Partial Decree of Divorce, dated August 24, 2005); p. 26 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, dated October 30, 2007). The original finding was based, at least in part, on 
Dennis' admission that he and Renee had been married on that date, and remained married 
through the date of the Complaint and Dennis' oral request for a decree of divorce. The latter 
finding was further based on Dennis' testimony at trial regarding the marriage. Having 
specifically found that the parties were married (an issue that it always had jurisdiction to 
decide), the trial court then proceeded to determine a property and debt distribution between the 
parties. 
Contrary to his assertions, the issues raised by Dennis regarding the validity of the 
marriage are not jurisdictional issues (subject matter, or otherwise). Properly construed, they are 
an attempt to attack the trial court's specific findings of fact (based on the parties' admissions) 
that they had been married. Because the trial court determined the parties were married (which it 
undisputedly had jurisdiction to decide), and because that determination was made based on the 
admissions of the parties3, the trial court then determined that the property and debt distribution 
issues were ripe. Any allegations that the marriage was not valid are collateral attacks on the 
trial court's finding that the parties were, actually, married - not attacks on the trial court's 
jurisdiction to decide whether a valid marriage occurred. That subject matter jurisdiction always 
existed. 
B. The Appeal, Based on Jurisdictional Grounds, Should Be Dismissed. 
The original Partial Decree of Divorce was filed August 24, 2005. That Order was based 
on Dennis' own oral Motion requesting the parties be divorced and the marriage ended. Inherent 
3 Judicial estoppel, discussed below, also applies to these admissions since Dennis obtained an advantage (a decree 
of divorce) by making such admissions. 






























in this request, and the Order itself, is a finding that the parties were married (otherwise, what is 
there to seek a divorce for). That Partial Decree of Divorce (which appears to have been 
prepared by Dennis' own trial attorney) included a Rule 54(b) Certificate, declaring that the 
divorce decree was "a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules." Any appeal of the Partial Decree of Divorce 
(including, of course, an appeal based on the invalidity of the marriage), must have been filed 
within 45 days of the entry of the Partial Decree of Divorce, or by October 10, 2005. See 
fR. c.p 83(e); 6(a); 6(e)(1). No party, including Dennis, appealed the original Partial Decree of 
Divorce. Accordingly, the issue of the validity of the marriage was never properly appealed. 
Dennis' continued attempts to raise the issue now, over seven years after the time to appeal 
expired, should be dismissed as untimely. 
C. Dennis is Improperly Attempting, on Appeal, to Alter or Amend the Trial Court's 
JUdgment, Without Properly Complying With Rules 52, 59 or 60. 
The trial court made specific findings of fact, including that the parties were married, that 
certain property was separate vs. community property, and that an equalization payment from 
Dennis to Renee was required to equalize the community property allocations. In his appeal, 
Dennis is attempting to invalidate and/or dispute the factual findings and/or conclusions of law 
of the trial court. However, this attempt is being made without compliance with the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure at the trial court level. For instance, Rule 52 provides the procedure for 
seeking an amendment of specific findings of the court; Rule 59 provides the procedure for 
seeking a new trial or amendment of a judgment for certain issues, including newly discovered 
evidence; Rule 60 provides the procedure for relief from a final judgment or order based on 
"mistake" or "newly discovered evidence." All of these rules require the party seeking such 
relief to do so within 14 days (or six months in the case of Rule 60) of the order they are seeking 






























rehef from. In this case, Dennis failed to comply with these rules. No motions were made for 
any sort of relief from the original Partial Decree of Divorce, which ordered the divorce 
(including an inherent finding that the parties were malTied); no motions were made to amend 
the court's final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which integrated declarations related 
to the maniage itself. Having failed to properly comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Dennis is now seeking to use the appellate courts to solve his ilTeparable mistake of failing to 
comply with the relevant Civil Rules. 
Not only has he failed to comply with the relevant Rules of Civil Procedure, but Dennis 
IS seeking to overturn, through appeal, the trial court's decision using allegedly "newly-
discovered" evidence of the alleged failure to have an actual malTiage. R, p. 193-196 (Original 
Notice of Appeal, dated February 9, 2012); see also Appellant's Brief (relying on allegedly 
newly-discovered evidence). 4 However, the relevant Rules of Civil Procedure require that the 
"newly-discovered evidence" be evidence "which the party could not, with reasonable diligence, 
have discovered and produced at the trial" or that "could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial." See IRCP 59(a)(4); 60(b)(2). Here, there is no allegation that Dennis 
could not have discovered the alleged evidence of the invalidity of the malTiage prior to 
preparing and filing his Answer, admitting that the malTiage was valid. This evidence (to the 
4 In his Appellant's Brief, Dennis repeatedly and flagrantly discusses evidence that was never presented to the trial 
court. First is the alleged evidence from the State of Oregon regarding the lack of filing of a marriage certificate. 
Second are repeated references to the individual who performed the marriage ceremony, and Dennis' assertions that 
Renee was the party who made the arrangements for the wedding. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief, p. 27 - 31. Setting 
aside the fact that both categories of evidence were never presented to the trial court, and therefore are improper for 
appeal, Dennis urges the court on appeal to simply take judicial notice of the first evidence (the State of Oregon 
"records"). However, this is a misuse of the judicial notice provisions of LR.E. 201. See 1.RE 201 (b) (describing 
the kinds of facts which are subject to judicial notice); see also "Does Anybody Even Notice, " Terry L. Myers 
(Chief Bankruptcy Judge, District of Idaho), available at http://www.id.uscourts.gov/Articles/tlm-article-
DoesAnybodyNotice.pdf (last visited January 17, 2013). Renee strenuously disputes the assertion that the marriage 
ceremony was performed by her "family friend" (and therefore that she somehow colluded with this friend to falsify 
the marriage). This dispute of facts is, of course, the exact reason why evidence must be presented to the trial court 
not the appellate courts. 
INTERVENOR'S BRIEF ON APPEAL PAGE 11 
Matter: 6396-119 




Further, Dennis is attempting to use this newly-discovered evidence for the first time on 
4 
5 
appeal rather than at the trial court level. An appeal court will not address new issues or 
6 arguments on appeal. See, e.g., McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho at 397; Wattanbarger v. A.G. 
7 Edwards & Sons, Inc., 150 Idaho at 323-24. Dennis tries to avoid the fact that he is raising new 
8 
issues on appeal by arguing that this evidence deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction -
9 
10 
an issue that can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal. See Appellant's Brief, p. 
11 J 3 20. Nevertheless, as argued above, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case 
12 to decide the threshold question of whether the parties were actually married. The trial court 
13 
did so, based on the parties' own admissions. This appeal is not about subject matter 
14 
15 
jurisdiction, it is about allegedly newly-discovered evidence that Dennis believes should change 














present allegedly new evidence in the garb of subject matter jurisdiction does not change the 
underlying fact that the court had jurisdiction. Dennis simply failed to investigate prior to 
admitting a marriage existed, and now disagrees with the court's conclusions. Nevertheless, 
Dennis failed to take the steps to properly present his position to the trial court. 
D. Judicial Estoppel Dictates That Dennis' Arguments on Appeal Should Be 
Denied. 
Judicial estoppel exists to prevent a party from taking one position to gain an advantage, 
and then later taking a different position to gain a different advantage. See Indian Springs LLC 
v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho at 748. Dennis argues that his marriage was invalid. 
However, at the trial court level, Dennis repeatedly admitted that he had been married, and 
repeatedly requested the court grant him orders (i.e., a dissolution order, and later property 
INTERVENOR'S BRIEF ON APPEAL PAGE 12 
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division) based on that marriage. Having had a property division payment ordered against him, 
2 Dennis is now attempting to avoid the trial court's decision by arguing subject matter 
3 
jurisdiction. However, Dennis already admitted, at the trial court level, that the court had 
4 
5 
jurisdiction to decide whether a marriage existed and should be ended. Principles of judicial 
6 estoppel prevent Dennis from now refuting his previous admissions (and the benefit he gained 
7 from them dissolution of marriage and division of property). 
8 
9 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
10 
11 The legal authorities and rules cited above are clear and unambiguous. The trial court 
12 clearly ruled the parties were married and subsequently granted them a divorce. This judgment 
13 
was certified as a final judgment. As this authority is clear and well-developed, and the 
14 
15 
judgment granting a divorce based on a marriage was clearly a final judgment, Dennis' appeal of 
16 the sole issue in this appeal is untimely, frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. For 
17 this reason, and pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, Intervenor Jeremy J. Gugino is entitled to an 
18 




















Here, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate judge's 
4 
5 
findings of fact (that the parties were married) and conclusions of law (that a divorce could be 
6 granted). The District Court on appeal affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. Accordingly, 
7 this Court should affirm the District Court's decision and decide this appeal in the Appellant and 
8 
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